emergence involved, formally as well as politically, turning a world upside down." As this antipodean configuration develops into the nineteenth century, imperial Britain is the subject of its unsettling interplay. Whereas the British seek to "exorcise the ghosts of American insubordination," as when Victorian writers such as J. A. Froude portray Australia as England's natural progeny, the US "intervenes as a shadowy presence in Australian culture," challenging the bond between parent and colony. For example, in Marcus Clarke's harrowing narrative of transportation to a penal colony, For the Term of His Natural Life (1874), a convict escape takes place on 4 July, the US Independence Day. This formulation works in reverse when American writers like Mark Twain are haunted by Australia, the living emblem of a colonial past that the US cultural mythology has actively suppressed.
In what is, perhaps, the most dramatic effect of the parallax zone, the antipodean configuration extends to Irish nationalism. Giles likens the involvement of US whaling ships in aiding the escape of British political prisoners, such as the Fenian John Boyle O'Reilly, to a "kind of miniature version of the Underground Railroad operating on a complex transpacific axis." Whereas Charles Dickens and Anthony Trollope propagate the cliché of an emigrant paradise in the antipodes, Herman Melville's "textual poetics of inversion" bespeaks the more complicated position of the liminal subaltern. For Giles, Moby-Dick (1851) instances a pattern in which America and Australia "exchange places." While Australia, "the geographical antipodes to Britain, is enfolded imperially as an extension of the mother country," "the US increasingly becomes, in a political sense, Britain's antipodean antithesis." If the high point of this formulation is a compelling micropolitics, as in the solidarity between Fenian convicts and US whalers, its more slow-burning discursive payoff is the cosmopolitan self-parody that Giles finds in Twain's travel writings.
I would like to extend Giles's antipodean configuration in part by furthering his discussion of Trollope. Although Trollope is best known for novels of English provincial life-autoethnographic fictions of an imaginary county called Barsetshire-he was simultaneously the author of travel writings such as The West Indies and the Spanish Main (1859), North America (1862), Australia and New Zealand (1873), and South Africa (1878). 1 Trollope's works thus remind us that the word imperialism in this context is, in fact, shorthand for a heterogeneous English expansion that began with Ireland in the sixteenth century and, by the 1850s, had come to include settlement colonies such as Canada and Australia, West Indian colonies for the production of commodities, and a presence on the Indian subcontinent which had mutated from a commercial monopoly into a territorial empire, enlarged by conquest-as during the period in which Franklin was writing-and sustained by the rule and taxation of a vast non-European population. 2 Trollope's enthusiasm for white settler colonies should be distinguished from his comparative distance from an emerging New Imperial ideology (symbolized by the crowning of Victoria as Empress of India in 1876) which romanticized British rule over non-Europeans. In representing settler colonies as organic extensions of the English metropole, Trollope participated in a "Greater British" imaginary that included Charles Dilke's Greater Britain (1868) and J. R. Seeley's The Expansion of England (1881-82) among other works. For Trollope, the English migration to temperate lands like Australia was less an expansion of Britain's political sovereignty than of Anglo-Saxon blood and culture. Indeed, to his mind the US remained a British "colony," for it was a land cultivated by "Anglo-Saxon people," one in which "the descendants of our forefathers, are living and still speaking our language" (South Africa 1: 1). This belief in the legitimate expansion of Anglo-Saxons in the world's temperate zones stood in contrast to Trollope's discomfort with territorial imperialism in densely populated Asia and Africa. For whereas Trollope believed that indigenous people such as the New Zealand Maoris were destined to "melt away" upon contact with "the higher race" (Australia Trollope's distinctly mid-Victorian global outlookpro-Anglo-Saxon settlement, but at odds with the New Imperialism that began to take hold in the 1870s-is thus an illuminating context for the triangular configuration of an antipodean America. For by defining settler colonialism against territorial empire as a form of non-imperialism-and by viewing indigenous peoples such as the Maoris, not as imperial subjects, but as inferior races doomed for extinction-Trollope anticipated the very discourse of American exceptionalism that would eventually define the US not only as a new, un-European nation, but as new and un-European precisely in its distance from European projects of empire. 4 This is, in fact, the thesis of Neil Smith's American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization (2003), which argues that during the so-called American century, the US global hegemony was extended through a policy of economic domination that refused to name itself as imperialism and which today is simply called globalization.
One way of framing the "global dimension" that Giles takes for his endpoint, therefore, is as a centuries-old capitalist expansion. Through a spherical trajectory that initially moves from north to south, a regime of economic imperatives (now called "market forces") seeks to impose its unchallenged dominion over the globe. England's colonies of settlement in North America represent a landmark in this history, for they stand apart from previous empires (e.g., the Roman, Arabic, and Dutch) in offering what Ellen Meiksins Wood describes as the first "form of imperialism driven by the logic of capitalism" (73). Early modern theorists of settlement such as John Locke justified the colonization of land not in a political right to rule subject people, but in a providentially sanctioned economic "obligation" to remedy waste through the productive appropriation of natural resources (Meiksins Wood 99). 5 On this longue durée, the shift from displacing "unproductive" indigenous people in, for example, nineteenth-century Australia, to the "liberalization" of inefficient postcolonial economies in the twenty-first century marks a difference between identifiable phases, spatial as well as temporal, in an ongoing process of capitalist globalization. The postwar handoff from British Empire to Pax Americana is a matter of relatively secondary importance. 6 While Giles's evocation of the parallax zone recognizes the global matrix as its ultimate frame, the emphasis on antipodean configurations and the repressed postcoloniality of American history points, instead, to a productive focus on the micropolitical. Although I share Giles's enthusiasm for the nuance and play of this antipodean perspective, I want to sound a small note of caution. In a suggestive essay on For the Term of his Natural Life, Nicholas Birns reminds us that the primary setting of Clarke's novel, Tasmania, was "the sole state in Australia that claimed the complete extermination of its Aboriginal population" (132). Tasmania thus represents the "quintessence" of Australia's two colonizing regimes: the first over this lost indigenous population and the second over white transportees and colonists (133). When Giles cites Clarke's fictional administrator thanking providence for the "delightfully barren" landscape that makes Tasmania ideal for a penal colony, he notes an "inverted corollary to the American notion of Manifest Destiny"; where America's "open country" promises freedom, Australia's hinders escape. Yet, as Giles surely knows, the most speechless of all subalterns in the configuration he describes is the one whose silence is prefigured by extinction discourses emanating from every point on the triangle.
It seems to me that we can grant the power of antipodean unsettlement so long as we also bear in mind the macropolitical structures that sometimes flummox even the subtlest interplay. We can, for example, grant the contemporaneity of Britain's dominion over India and the American colonies so long as we also remember that Franklin's "postcolonial" 1787 polemic coincided not only with the settlement of New South Wales but also with the East India Company's transition from a trading monopoly to a governing apparatus in the scandalous aftermath of the Warren Hastings trials. Likewise, we can follow Giles's lead in excavating the transpacific networks that enabled American whalers to liberate Irish political prisoners in Australia so long as we also bear in mind that no political account of the US as "Britain's antipodean opposite" can explain the Maori-like plight of North America's indigenes or, to invoke the parallax effect yet again, the landing of US marines in Buenos Aires to protect American interests during a revolution in 1852, the year after Moby-Dick was published. The antopidean triangle is an exacting mode of denaturalizing transnational analysis as well as an ideal micropolitical prism, but it is not, as Giles well knows, a reliable cross-section of the global matrix.
Notes 3. Seeley's discomfort with the growing importance of the Indian empire was even more vocal. His vision of a federation of white-settler colonies stood in direct contrast to a British empire focused on the forcible rule of an "alien" people. Since the notion of a Greater British federation was premised on "the community of blood between England and her colonies," it did not "apply to India": "Two races could scarcely be more alien from each other than the English and the Hindus" (147). Needless to say neither Trollope nor Seeley was persuaded by liberal claims for an imperial "civilizing mission."
The antopidean triangle is an exacting mode of denaturalizing transnational analysis as well as an ideal micropolitical prism, but it is not, as Giles well knows, a reliable cross-section of the global matrix.
